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INTRODUCTION 
The United States and other foreign parties that have business interests 
in the People’s Republic of China must often decide between commercial 
arbitration and filing suit in Chinese courts when disputes arise with 
Chinese parties.  If the parties contract to resolve their disputes at a 
commercial arbitration institution in China1, they will have to understand 
the practice of med-arb.  Med-arb is the acronym for mediation-arbitration, 
a type of dispute resolution that combines mediation (or “conciliation”2) 
 
* J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2014; B.A., International Relations - 
Economics, Wellesley College, 2011.  The author thanks Professor Anne Kringel for her 
guidance throughout the writing process. The author also thanks the members of the 
University of Pennsylvania Journal Of Business Law for their editorial assistance 
throughout the final stages of preparing this comment for publication. 
 1.  This does not include Hong Kong.  See infra n.71 and accompanying text 
(discussing the practice of commercial arbitration in China). 
 2.  A term that is used interchangeably with mediation in China and in this article. 
Sally A. Harpole, The Combination of Conciliation with Arbitration in the People’s 
Republic of China, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 623, 623 (2007). 
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and arbitration, with the same person serving as arbitrator and mediator.  
Combining these two distinct dispute resolution processes to form one 
process is very controversial because, among other things, it compromises 
the neutrality of the arbitral tribunal, makes uncertain the enforceability of 
the arbitral award in foreign jurisdictions, and requires arbitrators to also be 
effective mediators.  However, the practice of med-arb is permitted and 
used in China. 
In recent years, “in order to achieve economic development . . . 
[China] has aggressively established laws, rules and regulations that govern 
arbitration and litigation.”3  However, due to continuing perceived links 
between the judiciary and government, Chinese nationals and non-Chinese, 
foreign investors often attempt to resolve their disagreements through 
mediation if at all possible, rather than to subject themselves directly to 
Chinese courts.4 
Chinese law and custom encourages the amicable settlement of 
disputes.  This encouragement has roots in the writings of the ancient 
philosopher, Confucius, who promoted the values of social harmony and 
the peaceful resolution of conflict.5  During Communist Party rule, 
mediation has been used as a way to settle disputes while getting the parties 
to adopt the Communist Party’s values of conformity.6  As a result, 
mediation is widely practiced throughout China, at the grass roots levels of 
society, in foreign commercial dealings, and unsurprisingly, in arbitration. 
The concept of med-arb is not unique to China, and variations of the 
practice have been used in Western countries, but it is much less accepted 
and much less common.7  To effectively arbitrate in China, counsel must 
understand med-arb’s advantages and its disadvantages with respect to 
arbitration-only proceedings.  Ideally, foreign parties will realize that med-
arb in China is very valuable, it is not so different from what they are used 
to, and that Western practices can learn from Chinese med-arb.  This paper 
contributes to the existing literature by focusing on the experience and 
perspective of a fully financially independent commercial arbitration 
institution and one of the top choices when choosing an arbitration forum 
 
 3.  Carlos de Vera, Arbitrating Harmony: ‘Med-Arb’ and the Confluence of Culture 
and Rule of Law in the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes in China, 18 
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 149, 169 (2004). 
 4.  Id. at 152. 
 5.  Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Fan Kun, Integrating Mediation into Arbitration: 
Why It Works in China, 25 J. INT’L ARB. 479, 480 (2008). 
 6.  Id. at 482. 
 7.  See, e.g., Robert L. Ebe, Cooper White & Cooper LLP, Med/Arb as a Variant on 
the Usual ADR Process (July 20, 2012), available at 
http://www.cwclaw.com/publications/articleDetail.aspx?id=655. (illustrating the use of 
med-arb in the United States). 
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in Mainland China,8 the Beijing Arbitration Commission (BAC).  In recent 
years, med-arb has become even more attractive because progressive 
Chinese local arbitration commissions like the BAC have been consciously 
improving their practices and moving towards greater independence, 
impartiality, and competence. 
I. THE MED-ARB PROCESS 
Mediation and arbitration are the most common forms of alternative 
dispute resolution for commercial disputes.9  Mediation is a voluntary 
dispute resolution process and the parties in a mediation are not bound to 
resolve their dispute.10  Because of their voluntary nature, mediations are 
essentially negotiations that are facilitated by a mediator.11  Arbitration, on 
the other hand, is a dispute resolution process in which a neutral party, the 
arbitrator or the arbitration panel, hears a dispute between parties and 
renders a final decision in favor of one of the parties.12  Med-arb combines 
these two processes, with the arbitrator also serving as the mediator. 
The Arbitration Law of China, which came into effect on September 
1, 1995, and the respective Arbitration Rules of Chinese arbitration 
institutions provide the legal framework for arbitration and med-arb.13  The 
arbitration laws increased confidence in the finality and enforceability of 
arbitration awards in the courts, causing the proliferation of local 
arbitration commissions (LACs) in China.14  In his study, Fuyong Chen 
notes that “any Chinese arbitration institution can arbitrate domestic and 
international cases regardless of the location of the dispute or [the location 
of the] parties.”15  Recently, the top LACs have been dealing with more 
international commercial arbitrations than ever before because “more 
foreign companies negotiating with Chinese counterparts are being 
encouraged to incorporate arbitration clauses in their contracts to settle 
 
 8.  Arthur Dong, Significant Changes Proposed in Beijing Arbitration Commission’s 
(‘BAC’) New Rules (2015), available at 
http://www.chinalawvision.com/2014/02/articles/china-arbitration-and-arbitrat/significant-
changes-proposed-in-beijing-arbitration-commissions-bac-new-rules/. 
 9.  LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/alternative_dispute_resolution (last visited Apr. 6, 2013). 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  National Arbitration FORUM, http://www.adrforum.com/faq.aspx?faq=876 (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2013). 
 13.  Sally A. Harpole, The Combination of Conciliation with Arbitration in the People’s 
Republic of China, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 623, 624 (2007). 
 14.  Fuyong Chen, Striving for Independence, Competence, and Fairness: A case Study 
of the Beijing Arbitration Commission, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 313, 313-14 (2007). 
 15.  Id. at 314. 
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their disputes before LACs.”16 
Article 51 of the Arbitration Law of China states that “a written 
conciliation statement [resulting from mediation] and an arbitration award 
shall have equal legal effect.”  Article 51 also provides arbitrators with a 
flexible framework for deciding when and how to conduct conciliation 
during arbitration: 
The arbitration tribunal may carry out conciliation prior to giving 
an arbitration award.  The arbitration tribunal shall conduct 
conciliation if both parties voluntarily seek conciliation.  If 
conciliation is unsuccessful, an arbitration award shall be made 
promptly.  If conciliation leads to a settlement agreement, the 
arbitration tribunal shall make a written conciliation statement or 
make an arbitration award in accordance with the result of the 
settlement agreement.17 
Article 39 of the Arbitration Rules of the Beijing Arbitration Commission 
(“BAC”) is similar, but clarifies that conciliation may be conducted at the 
arbitral tribunal’s discretion, as long as the tribunal obtains consent of both 
parties: 
Conciliation by the Tribunal18 
(1) The Arbitral Tribunal may, at the request of both parties or 
upon obtaining the consent of both parties, conciliate the case in 
a manner it considers appropriate.  (2) If the conciliation leads to 
a settlement, the parties may withdraw their claims and 
counterclaims if any, or request the Arbitral Tribunal to issue a 
Statement of Conciliation or make an award in accordance with 
the terms of the settlement.  (3) [The Statement of Conciliation] 
shall be binding once both parties have acknowledged receipt of 
it.19 
The BAC, founded in 1995, is a leading arbitration institution and became 
fully financially independent from the government early on, in 1998.20  It 
 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted at the Ninth Meeting 
of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People’s Congress on August 31, 1994, 
promulgated by Order No.31 of the President of the Peoples Republic of China on August 
31, 1994, and effective as of September 1, 1995). 
 18.  In standard arbitration proceedings at the BAC, each party selects one member of 
the arbitral tribunal, and the Chairman, based on the arbitrator’s background and expertise, 
selects the lead arbitrator.  Summary (or expedited) proceedings are presided by a sole 
arbitrator selected by the Chairman.  Article 18 and 48 of the Arbitration Rules of the BAC. 
 19.  Arbitration Rules revised and adopted at the First Meeting of the Fifth Session of 
the Beijing Arbitration Commission on September 20, 2007. Effective as of April 1, 2008. 
 20.  GAR, Beijing Arbitration Commission (BAC), 
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/regional-arbitration/6/category/88/entry/566/ (last visited 
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practices independent hiring for staff as well.21  In terms of caseload,22 the 
BAC is comparable to the China International Economic and Trade 
Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), the most visible arbitration institution, 
which was established by the China Chamber of International Commerce.23  
The BAC is the main LAC referenced in this article. 
In practice, conciliation procedures can commence after arbitration 
has been initiated, and when the conciliation is unsuccessful, the parties 
return to the arbitration procedure.24  The arbitrator may choose the 
appropriate moment in the course of the proceedings to offer the tribunal’s 
services for settlement purposes.25  Arbitrators conduct conciliation by 
caucusing.  Russell Thirgood explains that arbitrators conduct mediation in 
one of the following ways: “the arbitrator consulting with both parties, 
arbitrators consulting with the parties individually, the parties consulting 
with each other without the arbitrators present or a combination of these 
techniques.”26 
A common dispute over share transfer agreements might help 
illustrate the med-arb process better.  A shareholder (respondent)27 alleged 
that their share transfer agreements with a company (claimant)28 were void 
for misrepresentation.  The claimant commenced arbitration proceedings 
before the BAC, claiming that the agreements were valid.  After 
preliminary procedures, the tribunal heard the claimant’s opening statement 
and the respondent’s defense.29  The tribunal then proceeded to examine the 
 
Apr. 26, 2015). 
 21.  See Fuyong Chen, Striving for Independence, Competence, and Fairness: A case 
Study of the Beijing Arbitration Commission, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 313 (2007). 
 22.  The BAC had 1,473 cases in 2012, 1,471 cases in 2011, and 1,566 cases in 2010. 
2012 Work Summary of Beijing Arbitration Commission (BAC), BEIJING ARBITRATION 
COMMISSION, http://arbitrator.bjac.org.cn/en/about_us/2012-2013.html (last visited May 20, 
2015); Speech in Tea Party of 2012 Spring Festival, BEIJING ARBITRATION COMMISSION, 
http://arbitrator.bjac.org.cn/en/about_us/2011-2012.html (last visited May 20, 2015); Speech 
at the Tea Party of 2011 Spring Festival, BEIJING ARBITRATION COMMISSION, 
http://arbitrator.bjac.org.cn/en/about_us/2010-2011.html (last visited May 20, 2015). 
Similarly, the CIETAC had 1,060 cases in 2012, 1,435 cases in 2011, and 1,352 cases in 
2010.  Statistics, CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION, 
http://www.cietac.org/index.cms (last visited April 26, 2015). 
 23.  CIETAC, Introduction, http://www.cietac.org/index.cms (last visited Apr. 26, 
2015). 
 24.  Sally A. Harpole, The Combination of Conciliation with Arbitration in the People’s 
Republic of China, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 623, 625-27 (2007). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Russell Thirgood, A Critique of Foreign Arbitration in China, 17 J. INT’L ARB. 3, 
89, 92-93 (2000). 
 27.  Used instead of “Defendant” at the BAC. 
 28.  Used instead of “Plaintiff” at the BAC. 
 29.  Author’s own notes on the hearing process at the BAC (on file with the author). 
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claimant’s evidence and respondent’s evidence.30  Typically, the tribunal 
will make inquiries to the parties after the evidence is presented and decide 
whether to attempt conciliation.31  In this case, the tribunal decided to 
pursue conciliation and both the claimant and respondents consented.32  
First, the tribunal spoke with both parties in a face-to-face caucus.  The 
tribunal proposed that the claimant make a payment of 250 million RMB to 
the respondents in exchange for the agreement to be performed.33  Both 
sides expressed dissatisfaction with the proposal, which meant further 
back-to-back caucusing, first privately with the claimant, then with the 
respondent.34  The respondent no longer wanted to conciliate.  After the 
unsuccessful conciliation, the arbitral tribunal resumed arbitration and gave 
the parties an opportunity to debate.35  No additional evidence or a second 
hearing was required.36  The tribunal deliberated and issued an arbitral 
award.37 
II. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MED-ARB 
For those who have arbitration clauses embedded in contracts that 
designate a LAC as the forum of arbitration and for those who have joint 
ventures38 in China, in which case arbitration must be at a Chinese 
arbitration institution as an alternative to court, understanding med-arb’s 
advantages and disadvantages with respect to arbitration-only proceedings 
will allow the parties and their counsel to make a more informed decision 
about whether to consent to conciliation. 
A. Advantages 
Advantages of med-arb in China include amicable settlement of 
commercial disputes, the flexibility to tailor dispute resolution to the needs 
of the parties, and more efficient outcomes.  These advantages are coupled 
with med-arb’s higher likelihood of enforcement in Chinese courts than 
 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  See DETLEV F. VAGTS, WILLIAM S. DODGE & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, 
TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS (University Casebooks, 4th ed. 2008) (discussing the 
business effects of arbitration clauses). 
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that of mediation alone.39  Furthermore, the New York Convention only 
recognizes the enforceability of arbitral awards and does not include 
conciliation statements.40  The New York Convention, also known as the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, aids the 
enforcement in domestic courts of awards granted in foreign countries.41  
Most United Nations member states are parties to the convention.42  Of 
course, each advantage is not without its limitations. 
1. Amicable settlement 
With med-arb, parties can receive the advantages of both an 
enforceable award and amicable settlement.  Many practitioners and 
scholars have asserted that parties from Western European and North 
American cultures are often more adversarial than those from Asian 
cultures.43  Because Asian cultures are assumed to value harmony to a 
greater degree, stemming from Confucianism, Asian cultures are assumed 
to be more suitable for med-arb.44  However, the amicable settlement med-
arb provides is not necessarily a significant advantage as it may be a 
generalization given the globalized nature of med-arb.45  For instance, 
“given the increasingly globalized nature of education and employment, 
officers, directors, and general counsels of a company may have been 
educated overseas and may have worked in different countries.”46  
Therefore, their attitudes towards conflict and conflict resolution may 
accordingly reflect their backgrounds.47  Professor Tai-Heng Chen of the 
New York Law School suggests that factual investigation into the cultural 
attitudes of the specific litigant and its counsel is necessary to determine if 
 
 39.  See Debaditya Datta & Aonkan Ghosh, Mediation and Enforceability: Asia’s 
Growing Dilemma, 1, 4 (2011) (unpublished paper) available at 
http://works.bepress.com/debaditya_datta/1 (discussing the enforcement of mediation and 
arbitration clauses in Asia). 
 40.  Id. at 14. 
 41.  See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
art. 1, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, 7 I.L.M. 1046 (recognizing and 
enforcing foreign arbitral awards). 
 42.  See New York Convention Countries, NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION, 
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/contracting-states/list-of-contracting-states (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2013) (listing participants to the New York Convention). 
 43.  See Tai-Heng Chen, Reflections on Culture in Med-Arb, 34 N.Y. LAW SCHOOL 
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, 422 (Sept. 10, 2010) (noting the effects of culture on arbitration). 
 44.  Id. at 424. 
 45.  Id. at 425. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
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med-arb will provide this advantage to the case at hand.48 
2. Flexibility 
The fact that the Chinese approach to combining conciliation with 
arbitration is conducted within a highly flexible framework allows 
arbitration to accommodate many non-legal factors to achieve effective 
resolution of the commercial dispute.  Chinese law does not impose 
conciliation on the arbitral tribunal at the beginning of the arbitration 
proceedings.  The arbitral tribunal may attempt conciliation at any time in 
the proceedings before an award is made.  This makes it more flexible than 
arbitration-only proceedings and leaves the decision as to when to attempt a 
conciliation procedure at the discretion of the arbitral tribunal, in agreement 
with the parties.  Whether or not the arbitral tribunal decides to attempt 
conciliation depends on factors such as the nature of the dispute, the areas 
of expertise of the arbitrators and mediators, the cost of arbitration, how 
entrenched the parties are, and business pressures to settle.49 
3. Efficiency50 
Med-arb “encompasses all the benefits that usually are attributed to 
settled, rather than decided, outcomes, such as [cost and time savings].”51  
Should parties fail to reach an amicable solution, they may still resolve 
their dispute through arbitration, also potentially with cost and time 
savings.  Parties who choose arbitration are often dissatisfied with the 
length of time that commercial arbitration takes, while “in-house counsels 
are [also] facing tremendous pressure to economize.”52  In med-arb, the 
arbitrator already knows the case, and the parties do not need to educate 
another party appointed as the mediator, which would include duplication 
of work and delays.53 
Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler of the University of Geneva 
points out that the ultimate arbitral award often is more acceptable even if 
 
 48.  Id. at 426. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  See Carlos de Vera, Arbitrating Harmony: ‘Med-Arb’ and the Confluence of 
Culture and Rule of Law in the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes in China, 
18 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 149, 164 (2004) (discussing the cultural influence of dispute 
resolution mechanisms in China). 
 51.  Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Fan Kun, Integrating Mediation into Arbitration: 
Why It Works in China, 25 J. INT’L ARB. 4, 490 (2008). 
 52.  Chen, supra note 39, at 423. 
 53.  See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 46 (noting the efficiencies of arbitration). 
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no settlement is reached.54  Compared to the situation where the parties 
commenced arbitration without first attempting mediation, in med-arb, the 
mediation process may bring the parties closer together through offers and 
counteroffers so that if an issue does proceed to arbitration, the differences 
between the positions are often minimal.55  Previous negotiations will also 
have served to narrow down the issues that could lead to more predictable 
solutions.56  Using med-arb, much of the arbitration process can be made 
more efficient. 
4. Building Trust 
A powerful argument in favor of med-arb is that following a failed 
mediation, the mediators should continue on as the arbitrators if trust is 
built up between the parties and the arbitrators whom they have voluntarily 
appointed.  “If the parties have gained such strong confidence in the 
mediator during the course of the mediation that they actually would prefer 
to have him or her arbitrate the remaining issues . . . this choice should be 
respected.”57  Arbitrators who are effective mediators will be able to gain 
the trust of both parties.58  The experience of LACs shows that combining 
methods of dispute settlement makes mediation more likely to produce a 
settlement than when conducted separately, which could be explained by 
the trust built up between the parties and the arbitrators.59 
B. Disadvantages 
Disadvantages of med-arb include concerns about the neutrality of the 
arbitral tribunal, the enforceability of the award in jurisdictions that are 
more skeptical of the legitimacy of med-arb, and the ability of arbitrators to 
also be effective mediators.  In light of the competition among arbitration 
institutions for cases, especially for the BAC, which is financially 
independent, the neutrality and competence of arbitrators should be less 
and less of a concern.  The greatest challenge to med-arb that remains is the 
unpredictability of international enforcement, but as med-arb is being 
 
 54.  Id. at 491. 
 55.  Id. at 488. 
 56.  Id. at 491. 
 57.  Id. at 492. 
 58.  See infra note 54 and accompanying text (explaining why good arbitrators possess 
mediation skills). 
 59.  Id. at 491. Wang Shengchang, CIETAC’s Perspective on Arbitration and 
Conciliation Concerning China, in New Horizons in International Commercial Arbitration 
and Beyond, ICCA Congress Series No. 12, 27, 40 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2005). 
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refined, confidence in Chinese med-arb should grow. 
1. Neutrality 
There is always a certain level of discomfort in not knowing exactly 
what the arbitrator’s role will be,60 but more practical issues are the lack of 
cross-examination, nondisclosure of important information during 
mediation, and paternalistic arbitrators.  Each issue will be explored in 
depth. 
There is a risk of breach of due process safeguards if caucusing is used 
in the mediation phase, because the information obtained may prejudice the 
arbitral tribunal later in arbitration proceedings.61  For example, the 
mediator will often ask for each party’s bottom line and this may influence 
the final amount awarded if the mediator then becomes the arbitrator.62  
Furthermore, if information were revealed to the arbitrator privately during 
caucus, the other party would not have had an opportunity for cross-
examination.  “[T]he arbitrator may have already formed . . . his or her 
views as to the merits of each party’s position,” and “[e]ven [if the] [r]ules 
expressly exclude[] from the arbitrator’s decision making the information 
obtained during the conciliation, in practice the nature of a merged 
proceeding makes arbitrator [sic] objectivity difficult.”63  The parties may 
misuse the mediation as a way to make arguments to the arbitral tribunal to 
get ahead during the arbitration phase, rather than genuinely try to settle 
their case during the mediation phase.64  Realistically, caucusing is not the 
only situation in which the arbitrator has to disregard information 
received.65  There are always cases where improperly submitted documents 
or arguments are rejected or discarded after being reviewed by the 
arbitrator.66  If judges are trusted to be capable of disregarding inadmissible 
evidence, there should be no reason to doubt arbitrators in their ability to 
remain impartial despite the information obtained during mediation.67  
Moreover, in the US, it is not uncommon for state trial judges to also 
 
 60.  See Paul E. Mason, The Arbitrator as Mediator, and Mediator as Arbitrator, 28 J. 
INT’L ARB. 6, 541, 545 (2011) (comparing and contrasting the roles of arbitrators and 
mediators). 
 61.  Thirgood, supra note 22, at 94. 
 62.  This information was obtained by the author through discussion with BAC staff 
and observing med-arb during my internship at the BAC. 
 63.  Thirgood, supra note 26, at 94-95. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 46, at 491 (discussing instances where 
information is disregarded by the arbitrator). 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
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mediate the cases over which they preside.68  This process is called a a 
judicial settlement and has long been used as a form of ADR.69  Judicial 
settlement parallels med-arb, which means med-arb should not seem all 
that unfamiliar to US parties.70 
If there is the possibility that mediation will fail and the arbitral 
tribunal will issue the final award, counsels might be less candid during the 
caucusing, which could reduce the chances of a successful mediation.71  
However, some argue that even in mediations, as in litigation or arbitration, 
counsel is expected to be an advocate for his clients.  They may not fully 
disclose information that they believe would weaken their position if 
revealed.  Thus, the criticism that counsel may be less candid in a med-arb 
than a pure mediation might not be grounded in reality. 
Some argue that independence and impartiality will not be a problem 
provided that the arbitral tribunal acts cautiously and certain safeguards are 
put in place during the conciliation.  While the Arbitration Law is silent on 
the subject of ethics and protocols for arbitrators who also act as mediators, 
some guidelines and requirements can be found in the Arbitration Rules.72  
To maintain its financial independence and to compete with other 
institutions, the BAC must attract a large caseload, which means it needs to 
uphold the reputation of neutrality and competence of its arbitrators.  The 
role of a case manager may vary depending on the arbitration institution.  
At the BAC, case managers closely monitor the performance of arbitrators, 
who will be removed if their performance is not up to the standards 
articulated by the BAC.73  For example, 44.7 percent of the arbitrators on 
the panel during the first term were not re-appointed in 1998.74  By 2005, 
the BAC had undergone three terms of changes and a total of 286 
arbitrators had not been reappointed.75  It is likely that retention of 
arbitrators will improve as a result of the increasing trainings and 
 
 68.  See JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES, 
http://www.osbar.org/public/legalinfo/1220_JudicialConferences.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 
2013) (outlining judicial settlement conferences). 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 46, at 491 (discussing the dangers of 
information that is revealed during mediation being potentially revealed during arbitration). 
 72.  See Sally A. Harpole, The Combination of Conciliation with Arbitration in the 
People’s Republic of China, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 623, 627 (2007) (describing some of the 
requirements of the Arbitration Rules). 
 73.  See Fuyong Chen, Striving for Independence, Competence, and Fairness: A case 
Study of the Beijing Arbitration Commission, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 313, 333 (2007) 
(discussing the arbitration process of the BAC). 
 74.  Id. at 332. 
 75.  Id. at 333. 
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examinations required to become a BAC arbitrator.76 
These safeguards should be weighed against their chilling effects.  In 
Hong Kong, if the case does not settle in mediation, the arbitrator has a 
duty to disclose as much information as possible obtained during the course 
of an ex parte discussion that is material to the arbitral proceedings, for the 
other party to consider and comment upon.77  This measure is likely to 
prevent parties from revealing information to the arbitrator if they would 
not like that information to be revealed to the other party. 
There does exist a key safeguard in med-arb: the parties are free to 
decide whether or not to use conciliation at all and, after conciliation has 
begun, the parties may also elect to discontinue using it.78  The available 
statistics on the use of conciliation combined with arbitration in China 
suggest that parties frequently decide to use med-arb.79  The parties are 
likely drawn to the benefits inherent in combining a negotiated settlement 
over which the parties retain control with the process of arbitration. 
Nevertheless, there are individual differences between arbitrators 
when conducting conciliation and these styles have changed over time.  As 
one commentator notes, “[b]efore the late 1980s, it was not uncommon for 
arbitral tribunals to adopt an evaluative approach, whereby [the arbitrator 
while serving as the mediator] proactively informed the parties regarding 
their preliminary views on the case in an attempt to persuade them to 
consider settling their claims.”80  Since their establishment following the 
promulgation of the Arbitration Law in 1994, arbitration institutions such 
as the BAC and CIETAC have emphasized the role the arbitrator plays as a 
facilitator during conciliation.  In line with this more modern emphasis, 
arbitrators who are engaged in mediation “are encouraged to exercise 
considerable caution and care in discussing their views” of the case in order 
to “avoid creating the appearance of bias.”81  Still, arbitrators are given a 
good deal of leeway in how they conduct the conciliation.  To enhance the 
parties’ confidence in the arbitral tribunal, the Arbitration Law and 
Arbitration Rules require that the tribunal diligently oversee the progress of 
the conciliation and that the tribunal resume the arbitration promptly if the 
conciliation does not result in a timely settlement.82 
 
 76.  Id. at 334 (describing the training that must be completed by BAC arbitrators). 
 77.  Edna Sussman, Med-Arb: an Argument for Favoring Ex Parte Communications in 
the Mediation Phase, 7 WORLD ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION REVIEW, no. 2, 2013, at 8. 
 78.  See Russell Thirgood, A Critique of Foreign Arbitration in China, 17 J. INT’L ARB. 
89, 93 (2000) (noting the optional nature of mediation in China). 
 79.  See Chen at 314 (showing the rapid increase of local arbitration commissions). 
 80. Sally A. Harpole, The Combination of Conciliation with Arbitration in the People’s 
Republic of China, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 623, 626 (2007). 
 81.  Id. at 626-27. 
 82.  Id. 
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There are also fundamental differences between Chinese and 
American conceptions of mediation.  For example, proposed settlements by 
judges in China can often be more coercive.  Judges will achieve settlement 
by threatening an unfavorable ruling should the mediation fail.  This might 
be appropriate for an emerging market like China, where arbitrators who 
have expertise in the specific type of commerce can be more paternalistic 
to encourage economic efficiency, but most non-Chinese parties will 
perceive the judge’s threats as a type of undesirable impartiality. 
Because of the differences between mediation and arbitration in China 
and elsewhere, the best practices of Western countries have inspired a “re-
examination of the values of mediation in China.”83  For example, “[t]o 
address the concerns of impartiality of the mediator-turned-arbitrator, the 
BAC now allows the parties to request the replacement of an arbitrator on 
the ground that the results of the award may be affected by his involvement 
in the mediation proceedings.”84  This rule is similar to the IBA rule 
requiring “the arbitrator to resign if he or she considers him or herself to 
lack objectivity as a result of a failed mediation attempt.”85  Another 
notable development is the BAC’s promulgation of separate mediation 
rules, which took effect on April 1, 2008.86  These new arbitration and 
mediation rules are designed to make med-arb more appealing to a Western 
audience. 
III. THE ARBITRATOR AND MEDIATOR 
It is rare to find individuals who are capable of serving as both a 
mediator and an arbitrator.  Any person wishing to serve as both a mediator 
and an arbitrator will not only need to possess the traits essential to both 
roles, but he or she will also need to know how and when to switch 
between the two roles.  The arbitrator serves as a type of private judge and 
must therefore possess a judicial temperament.  This person must have the 
ability to adjudicate by analyzing opposing arguments concerning the facts 
and law.87  “[H]e or she needs to have traits and skills such as strict 
neutrality and impartiality, knowledge of the law, ability to evaluate 
 
 83.  Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Fan Kun, Integrating Mediation into Arbitration: 
Why It Works in China, 25 J. INT’L ARB. 479, 492 (2008). 
 84.  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  See Paul E. Mason, The Arbitrator as Mediator, and Mediator as Arbitrator, 28 J. 
INT’L ARB. 541, 542 (2011) (comparing and contrasting the roles of arbitrators and 
mediators). 
ARTICLE 6 (LIU).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/15  1:39 PM 
1308 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:4 
 
documents and witnesses . . . and decision-making skills.”88  As Professor 
Paul Mason notes, an effective mediator needs to gain the trust of both 
parties and must “possess a very different set of traits and skills.”89  These 
skills include “interpersonal awareness . . . understanding the psychology 
of negotiations, finding hidden issues which may underlie the parties’ 
conflicts . . . and creativ[ely] helping parties fashion a unique solution for 
themselves.”90 
The BAC, for example, has been able to holistically monitor 
arbitrators and ensure that they are qualified as both arbitrators and 
mediators.  The BAC’s policy in selecting mediators considers the 
academic qualifications and previous job titles of arbitrators to be 
important, however the BAC is also aware that these factors may not “truly 
reflect[] the actual . . . abilities of an arbitrator in handling cases.”91  The 
revision of the BAC’s “Standards for Selection, Appointment and Re-
Appointment of Arbitrators” added the requirement that arbitrators must be 
capable of mediation work in addition to their other responsibilities.92  
While the BAC is stringent in selecting high caliber talent, it also values 
the importance of training and examination of current arbitrators.  Those 
who do not attend training courses and pass required exams on the 
arbitration rules, ethical standards, and arbitration practices will not be 
appointed by the Chairman.93  In Fuyong Chen’s study of the BAC, he 
notes that “if a previously appointed arbitrator . . . has not handled cases for 
a long period of time, the BAC will not re-appoint him [or her].”94  While 
some mediation skills can only come from natural personality traits, many 
other skills can be taught through training. 
VI. ENFORCEABILITY 
Parties should consider whether an award or settlement at the end of 
med-arb would be enforceable in the jurisdiction in which assets are 
located.95  Professor Tai-Heng Cheng has pointed out that “the 
enforceability of med-arb outcomes will remain a key issue . . . because 
 
 88.  Id. at 543. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Fuyong Chen, Striving for Independence, Competence, and Fairness: A case Study 
of the Beijing Arbitration Commission, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 313, 331 (2007). 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 333. 
 94.  Id. at 334. 
 95.  See Tai-Heng Cheng, Reflections on Culture in Med-Arb (New York Law School, 
Research Paper Series No. 34, Sept. 10, 2010), 427 (discussing the influence of culture on 
mediation and arbitration). 
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structural adjustments to fully accommodate med-arb within the 
international legal framework for alternative dispute resolution is unlikely 
to occur in the near future.”96  Cheng further argues that “[a]s a policy 
matter, to the extent that party autonomy is paramount, party preferences 
for med-arb should be accorded legal effect by international and national 
legal systems.”97  However, the New York Convention was drafted with 
participation from a small number of states, most of which do not favor 
med-arb.98  “The difficulties of obtaining consensus on an amendment that 
would more fully accommodate med-arb are demonstrated by the pace 
through which changes to the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration snake through the United Nations year after year.”99  
Nevertheless, as med-arb becomes more refined and effective in China, 
other countries may become more confident in the benefits of med-arb and 
it may become easier to enforce med-arb decisions. 
In December of 2011, the High Court of Hong Kong demonstrated its 
growing confidence in med-arb when it affirmed an award by the Xian 
Arbitration Commission despite alleged misconduct during med-arb.100  
This was a notable event because Hong Kong is a different jurisdiction 
with its own arbitration laws and it has been skeptical of med-arb in the 
past.101  As one commentator noted, “[t]his decision confirms Hong Kong’s 
pro-enforcement approach to arbitral awards, and reminds parties . . . that, 
whe[n] they believe some irregularity has occurred in the arbitral or med-
arb process, they must raise the issue promptly.”102  This commentator goes 
on to note that, if a party does not raise these issues in a timely manner, 
“the party risks being found to have waived its right to object to the award 
or to seek to have it set aside.”103  This is comforting to parties who seek 
the enforcement of a PRC award in Hong Kong based on arbitration or 
mediation that is administered in a way that differs from Hong Kong’s 
 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Herbert Smith Freehills, ADR Notes, Hong Kong High Court consider the med-arb 
procedure (June 8, 2008), available at http://hsf-adrnotes.com/2011/06/08/hong-kong-
courts-consider-the-mediation-arbitration-procedure/ (noting the high court’s decision to 
affirm the award, while analyzing the lower courts initial decision not to enforce the award). 
 101.  Id. (summarizing the Hong Kong lower court’s reasoning in its initial ruling that 
the Chinese med-arb award should not be enforced because the procedures used during the 
med-arb made enforcement of the award contrary to public policy). 
 102.  Mun Yeow and Morgana Brady, Hong Kong Enforces PRC ‘Med-Arb’ award, 
ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON, Feb. 9, 2012, available at 
http://www.allens.com.au/pubs/asia/foasia10jan12.htm. 
 103.  Id. 
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customary practices, i.e., through med-arb.104  It is reasonable to think that 
other countries may follow suit if their confidence in med-arb grows. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States and other foreign parties should understand and 
even appreciate the option of med-arb when the forum for a commercial 
dispute is a Chinese arbitration institution.  As Chinese arbitration 
institutions like the BAC refine their practice of med-arb, moving towards 
greater independence, impartiality, and competence, med-arb should 
become even more attractive.  Some even argue that “as Western legal 
systems come under increasing attack for being out of touch . . . and for 
being stifled by procedural baggage it is necessary to explore alternative 
options.”105  With the growth of commercial arbitration in China, arbitrators 
abroad may have a way to learn about the advantages of med-arb as an 
alternative to cumbersome Western legal procedures. 
The advantages of med-arb in China include amicable settlement of 
commercial disputes, the ability to better tailor dispute resolution to the 
needs of the parties, and more efficient outcomes.  In addition to these 
advantages, med-arb has a higher likelihood of enforcement in Chinese 
courts than mediation alone.  And the New York Convention only 
recognizes the enforceability of arbitral awards, not mediation agreements.  
The disadvantages of med-arb include potentially compromising the 
neutrality of the arbitral tribunal, the possibility of a lack of ability to 
enforce the award in certain jurisdictions, and the difficulty of finding 
candidates who can be effective as both arbitrators and mediators. 
The competition among commercial arbitration institutions for cases 
in recent years could make the impartiality and competence of arbitrators 
less of a problem.  The BAC has led the way as a financially independent 
and top choice LAC, raising standards and performance continuously.  The 
greatest challenge to med-arb is the unpredictability of international 
enforcement, but, as med-arb improves, confidence in Chinese med-arb 
will grow internationally.  Other countries like the United States may also 
think more about incorporating successful elements of med-arb into their 
own laws.106  Of course, greater efforts need to be made to implement the 
procedural safeguards necessary to address the disadvantages of med-arb 
 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Russell Thirgood, A Critique of Foreign Arbitration in China, 17 J. INT’L ARB. 89, 
89 (2000). 
 106.   See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Fan Kun, Integrating Mediation into 
Arbitration: Why It Works in China, 25 J. INT’L ARB. 479, 492 (2008) (describing a trend 
toward combining elements of multiple arbitration systems from different countries). 
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outlined in this paper.107  The exchange of ideas and procedures relating to 
arbitration between China and other countries could be used to improve 
arbitration in the United States and worldwide.108 
 
 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
